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No Constitutional Shelter: The Ninth 
Circuit's Reading of the Hybrid Claims 
Doctrine in American Friends Service 
Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh 1 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men 
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according 
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of 
all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity to-
wards each other.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990 the Supreme Court decided the case of Employ-
ment Division v. Smith. 3 There it held, "[I]f prohibiting the 
exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [tax or regula-
tion] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not 
been offended."4 The Court appeared to qualify this surpris-
ing5 and controversial6 rule by admitting that it had struck 
down generally-applicable legislation on the basis of the Free 
Exercise Clause7 in some "hybrid situation[s],"8 when the free 
exercise claim had been asserted "in conjunction with other 
1. 961 F.2d 140fi (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
2. THE VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS 
lLLUSTRATIN!i THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE FoRMATION OF THE 
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 1fi1 (Samuel Eliot Morison ed., 2d ed. 1965). 
::L 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
4. !d. at H7R. 
fi. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1. 
"The Court sharply changed existing law without an opportunity for briefing or 
argument, and it issued an opinion claiming that its new rules had been the law 
for a hundred years." !d. 
6. E.g, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Deci-
sion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1109-11 (1990). 
7. 494 U.S. at 881. 
8. !d. at RH2. 
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constitutional protections."9 The principle on which the Court 
said that it relied in such cases will be referred to as the hybrid 
claims doctrine. 
This note examines the hybrid claims doctrine as recently 
applied by the Ninth Circuit in a case where a Quaker organ-
ization asserted a free exercise claim against the federal gov-
ernment: American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thorn-
burgh. 10 A careful reading of Thornburgh suggests that the 
hybrid claims doctrine provides no genuine exception to the 
core holding of Smith. 
II. THE SMITH DECISION AND How IT 
CHANGED FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Where We Came From: The Sherbert Balancing Test 
The Constitution declares, "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof."11 In other words, the Free Exercise Clause 
protects freedom of religion by prohibiting Congress from pass-
ing laws that interfere with religious practice. On its own 
terms, the Free Exercise Clause applies only to congressional 
legislation. The Supreme Court, however, has extended the 
scope of the Free Exercise Clause to cover actions by state 
governments. 12 This means the Court makes no distinction 
between federal and state action for purposes of Free Exercise 
inquiry. 13 
Beginning with Sherbert v. Verner, 14 the Supreme Court 
evaluated Free Exercise Clause challenges according to a bal-
ancing test. 15 Justice O'Connor stated that test in the follow-
ing terms: "[T]he government [must] justify any substantial 
burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state 
interest and by means narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est."16 On one side of the scales lay the burden to religious 
9. ld. at RlH. 
10. 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, :no U.S. 296, 803 (1940). 
18. Id. 
14. 874 U.S. 898 (1963). 
Hi. ld. at 40:~. 
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
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practice caused by government action. On the other side lay the 
government's interest in pursuing that action. In practice, the 
Sherbert test gave religious freedom a less effective shield than 
it first appeared to construct. "The Court generally found either 
that the free exercise right was not burdened or that the gov-
ernment interest was compelling."17 Despite this trend in the 
high Court, religious practice received benefit from the Sherbert 
test. ''There were many more applications of the doctrine in the 
state and lower federal courts, and legislatures and executive 
bodies frequently conformed their decisions to its dictates."18 
From 1963 until 1989 the Court continued to apply the 
Sherbert test, 19 thus bolstering its strength by reconfirming its 
authority. In 1990, however, the Court eviscerated whatever 
protection the Sherbert test offered religious practice.20 
B. Where We Are Now: The Smith Decision 
1. Smith's core holding 
In Smith the Court reinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause 
to mean that government needs to show only that its statute 
does not specifically target a religious practice.21 As long as a 
regulation treats religious interests the same as every other 
interest, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause not to 
require governments to accommodate a religious practice that 
otherwise runs afoul of the statute.22 With a few narrow and 
ill-defined exceptions,23 this holding forms the general rule 
ring) (citations omitted). 
17. McConnell, supra note 5, at 1110. 
1R. ld. 
19. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 6RO, 699 (1989) ("The free exercise 
inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observa-
tion of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling gov-
ernmental interest justifies the burden.") (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("The essence of all that has been said and written on 
the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); 
Sherbert v. Verner, ::l74 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("(A]ny incidental burden on the free 
exercise of [a person's] religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in 
the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.'") 
(citations omitted). 
20. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 4 ("[T]he Free Exercise Clause itself now 
[after Smith] has little independent substantive content.") 
21. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
22. ld. at 878-79. 
23. For a discussion of these exceptions and their contours, see Laycock, supra 
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that now defines the scope of personal rights protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause.24 
2. The hybrid claims doctrine 
a. The language of the Smith opinion. To reach its 
conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause requires only that 
laws not directly target religious practice,25 the Court had to 
overcome a significant obstacle. Sherbert and some of its proge-
ny suggest that the First Amendment required greater defer-
ence toward religious practice than mere facial neutrality.26 
Those cases suggest instead that the Sherbert balancing test 
imposed on government an affirmative duty to avoid burdening 
religious practice. 27 In Smith the Court characterized this pre-
cedent in the following passage. 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally appli-
cable law to religiously motivated action have involved not 
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech and of the press.28 
This description of precedent in terms of a novel doc-
trine29 creates ambiguities. 
b. Two alternative readings. 
( 1) The hybrid claims doctrine is an attempt to 
distinguish contrary precedent. 30 Because the cases cited to 
note 4, at 39·54. 
24. See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 
1407 (1992) (amended opinion). 
25. See 494 U.S. at R78. 
26. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21fi (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 39R, 403 (1963). 
27. Id. 
2R. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, :n9 U.S. 105 
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, :no U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
29. Laycock, supra note 4, at 1. 
:;o. McConnell, supra note 5, at 1121-22; see infra note 36 and accompanying 
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this poine1 contradict the rule enunciated in Smith, the 
Smith Court had to somehow distinguish them. One leading 
commentator adopts this reading and suggests that the Smith 
Court articulated the hybrid claims doctrine "for the sole pur-
pose of distinguishing Yoder in this case."32 
Precedents can also be overruled sub rosa, which may be 
what happened in Smith. Compare, for example, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder33 with Smith. In Yoder the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause barred Wisconsin from applying its compulsory 
school attendance statute against members of the Old Order 
Amish religion, whose religious tenets required them to remove 
their children from public schools after the eighth grade.34 As 
part of its reasoning the Court addressed the issue of facial 
neutrality. "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its applica-
tion, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for gov-
ernmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of 
religion."35 Compare this language with the Smith holding, 
which permits legislation to burden religion so long as that 
effect is not the express purpose of the legislature. 36 Whatever 
its explicit treatment of precedent, the Court makes it clear 
that the balancing test of Sherbert and the high protection af-
forded free exercise claims expressed in Yoder have been most-
ly replaced by judicial deference to legislative decision-
making.37 
(2) The hybrid claims doctrine is an exception to the core 
holding of Smith. The passage from Smith could mean that a 
court should apply the general rule unless a plaintiff can show 
that her free exercise claim is accompanied by another consti-
text. 
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. ?115, 234 (1972); Follett v. McCormick, 321 
U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v. Penn;:;ylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-13, 117 (1943); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
32. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1121. 
33. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
34. ld. at 234. 
35. ld. at 220. 
:!6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
37. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
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tutional claim.38 This interpretation could lead in two possible 
directions. 
Lower courts might read the hybrid claims doctrine to 
reduce the number of enforced free exercise claims by requiring 
every free exercise claim to be coupled with another constitu-
tional claim. This would force plaintiffs to couch their free 
exercise claims in terms of hybrid claims, on the assumption 
that combining claims would result in an enforceable constitu-
tional claim. This idea of getting more out of a free exercise 
claim combined with another constitutional claim than one 
could get by asserting the free exercise claim alone has been 
compared by one commentator to Hamburger Helper. 39 
Read expansively, the hybrid claims doctrine might also 
increase the number of successful constitutional claims by 
allowing constitutional claims of doubtful strength to be invigo-
rated through hybridization. On this reading, the hybrid claims 
doctrine makes the Free Exercise Clause a kind of super-vita-
min to invigorate otherwise feeble constitutional claims. 
c. Criticism of both readings of the hybrid 
claims doctrine. 
( 1) The hybrid claims doctrine fails to distinguish Yoder. 
The Smith holding simply contradicts Yoder.40 Given that con-
tradiction, the Court in Smith probably could not have logically 
reached its holding without overruling Yoder. If so, the hybrid 
claims doctrine may not be capable of accomplishing what it 
3R. See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 
1409 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). Here the plaintiffs assert a free exercise 
claim coupled with a claim based on the "right to employ" and argue that this 
hybrid falls within "the exception for 'hybrid claims.'" !d. 
39. James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 
98 n.49 (1991). 
40. Dompare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("[Our] deci-
sions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes [or prescribes] conduct that his 
religion prescribes [or proscribes].'") (quoting United States v. Lee, 45fi U.S. 252, 
263, n.3 (1982)) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, 
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it 
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.") (citations omitted). This comparison 
emphasizes a point I made earlier. Supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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was invented to do. In light of its characterization of precedent 
quoted above, the Court in Smith appears not to have treated 
Yoder as controlling precedent, which it had an obligation to 
distinguish from the instant case. Rather, as one commentator 
boldly states, "[T]he Court's account of its precedents in Smith 
is transparently dishonest."41 Because the Smith Court treat-
ed Yoder disingenuously the hybrid claims doctrine can be read 
as a failed attempt to distinguish contrary precedent. 
(2) Does the hybrid claims doctrine provide a genuine excep-
tion to the core holding of Smith? Neither reading of the hy-
brid claims doctrine as a genuine exception to Smith is plausi-
ble. The restrictive reading transforms the Free Exercise 
Clause into a jurisprudential zero having no constitutional 
gravity of its own. The Smith holding had that effect al-
ready.42 If that's the entirety of the hybrid claims doctrine, 
then it has no substantive content beyond the meaning of the 
holding. The expansive reading swallows the general rule of 
Smith. If every feeble constitutional claim can receive new life 
merely by association with a free exercise claim, then Smith 
means nothing at all.43 
At the writing of Smith, the precise boundaries of its hold-
ing were unclear and remained to be worked out in future 
cases. 44 Part of that process of clarification has focused on the 
hybrid claims doctrine. As with most new rules, its meaning 
becomes clear only after application in the courts. The Ninth 
Circuit recently applied the hybrid claims doctrine in American 
Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh. 45 
41. Laycock, wpra note 4, at 2 (citations omitted). 
42. ld. at 4. 
43. See infra note R5 and accompanying text. 
44. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 9. "[A]lthough the Court distorted the ratio-
nale of its precedents beyond recognition, the exceptions and limitations to its new 
principle preserved all its prior results. We may be told in the next case that 
these results were really undermined by Smith and they must now be overruled 
after all .... Part of the task in future cases is to search for principled lines 
between what the Court has preserved and what it has rejected." ld. Among these 
"exceptions and limitations" is the hybrid claims doctrine. 
45. 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
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Ill. THE THORNBURGH LITIGATION 
A. Underlying Facts 
1. The history of the litigation 
[Volume 7 
In 1989, the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC) and some of its members sued the Attorney General, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the United 
States.46 AFSC challenged the provisions of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (I.R.C.A.),47 which require an 
employer to verify employees' immigration status and not to 
employ or continue to employ any person who is not authorized 
to work in the United States.48 Failure to comply with these 
provisions subjects an employer to civil penalties of up to 
$10,000 for each violation49 and criminal penalties of up to six 
months imprisonment.50 
The plaintiffs conceded that they had not complied with 
I.R.C.A. since its effective date.51 In support of their actions, 
they argued that complying with I.R.C.A. would violate their 
religious beliefs. Quakers believe that all human beings are 
equal and that they have a duty to help any human being in 
need. 52 If the plaintiffs were to check the immigration status 
46. American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 71R F. Supp. R20 (C.D.Cal. 
1989), affd, 961 F.2d 1405. The Federal Reporter contains three appellate opinions 
entitled American Friends v. Thornburgh: 941 F.2d 80R; 951 F.2d 957; and 961 
F.2d 1405. 
The third opinion was released on April 20, 1992, and supersedes the previous 
two opinions. Its only substantive change consists of a characterization and appli-
cation of the Supreme Court's holding in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) in terms of a four-part test for evaluating free exercise claims, rather than 
in the broader terms in which Smith was characterized in the earlier two opinions. 
The Ninth Circuit first enunciated this four-part test in its amended opinion in 
NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 129fi, 130fi (9th Cir. 1991) (amended opinion). 
4 7. 8 U.S. C. § 1324a (1988). 
48. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)-1342a(a)(2) (1988). 
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (1988). 
fiO. R U.S.C. § 1324a(O (191'18). 
fil. American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1406 
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
52. See Thornburgh, 71R F. Supp. at R21 (quoting the plaintiffs' religious belief 
in "the sacredness and equality of all human life"; IRWIN ABRAMS, THE NOBEL 
PEACE PRIZE AND THE LAUREATES 149 (1988) (referring to the Quaker belief that 
every person is endowed with the Inward Spirit of Truth and Love and Goodness, 
which should be "translated into action"); (CHRISTIAN CHURCHES OF AMERICA: 0RI-
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of their employees and refuse employment to anyone not autho-
rized to work in the United States, they would in effect rob 
them of their ability to feed and clothe themselves, thus adding 
to the sum of human misery.5a The contradiction between the 
requirements of I.R.C.A. and the requirements of the plaintiffs' 
religious convictions becomes even more apparent when one 
learns that the charitable activities of AFSC have their origin 
in the Quaker belief that the Inward Spirit of Truth and Love 
and Goodness should be translated into action through humani-
tarian efforts.54 On the basis of this contradiction between 
their religious practices and the law, the plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that the employer sanctions provisions of I.R.C.A. 
violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.55 The defendants responded by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.56 
To fully understand the clash of interests faced by the 
Ninth Circuit in Thornburgh, it is helpful to know something 
about the purposes behind I.R.C.A. and the history of AFSC. 
2. l.R.C.A.'s purposes 
Congressman Mazzoli of Kentucky, Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee and one of the leading forces behind 
I.R.C.A., listed what he considered to be the central purposes 
animating I.R.C.A. 
First, to prevent the uncontrolled influx of undocumented 
aliens into the United States; 
Second, to end the current exploitation of millions of 
undocumented aliens who live in a twilight subrosa [sic] soci-
ety, afraid to come forward, because of their illegal status; 
and 
<HNS AND BELIEFS, 144 (Milton V. Backman, Jr., 19R:i) (referring to the Quaker 
spirit of equality and humanitarianism). 
5:3. Tlwrnburgh, 71R F. Supp. at R21. 
54. Abrams, supra note fi2, at 149 (discussing William Penn's statement that 
the Inward Spirit should inspire believers to improve the condition of the world 
and reporting that the AFSC representative emphasized the religious grounds for 
the AFSC's humanitarian efforts in his Nobel lecture); see NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS, 
14-15 (Tyler Wasson, ed. 19R7) (noting the origin of AFSC's humanitarian work in 
the Quaker conviction that the Inward Spirit inheres in every person). 
5fi. Tlwrnburgh, 718 F. Supp. at R21. 
56. !d. 
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Third, to preserve the humanitarian traditions and gen-
erous ideals of this country regarding the admission of legal 
immigrants and refugees. 57 
Mazzoli further explained how the employers sanctions pro-
visions served the legislative purposes behind I.R.C.A.: 
This legislation seeks to close the back door on illegal immi-
gration so that the front door on legal immigration may re-
main open. The principal means of closing the back door, or 
curtailing future illegal immigration, is through employer 
sanctions .... 
Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here 
illegally or, in the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to ac-
cept employment in violation of their status. Employers will 
be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring 
unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from 
entering illegally or violating their status in search of employ-
ment. 58 
The end sought by Congress in passing I.R.C.A. was to control 
illegal immigration. The means it chose was to require employ-
ers to hire and employ only those authorized to work in the 
United States.59 This requirement that employers participate 
in the federal immigration scheme ran headlong into AFSC's 
long history of religiously-motivated charitable work. 
3. AFSC history 
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) was 
founded in 1917 by Quakers who wanted to provide opportuni-
ties for conscientious objectors to serve in nonmilitary capaci-
ties. In 194 7, AFSC, along with the Friends Service Council, a 
British Quaker charitable organization, received the Nobel 
Peace Prize.60 During its seventy-five year existence AFSC 
has participated in several relief efforts. Following the destruc-
tion of World War I it fed the Germans, just as it fed the Rus-
57. NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE lMMI<iRAT!ON RE~'ORM LAW OF 1986: AN-
ALYSIS, TEXT, AND LEUISLATIVE HISTORY 4V!-14 (1987). 
58. !d. at 314. 
59. !d. 
60. Abrams, supra note 52, at 148. 
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sians during the terrible famine of the early 1920s and assisted 
victims of Hitler's antisemitic attacks during the 1930s.61 
More recently, AFSC fed, clothed, and housed the victims of the 
1985 Mexico City earthquake. It distributed medicine, clothing, 
and other supplies to reduce the suffering of people in Nicara-
gua and also participated in the controversial sanctuary move-
ment.62 
At the time of the Thornburgh litigation AFSC employed 
about four hundred people.63 In accordance with its religious 
mission to relieve human need, AFSC has historically made 
employment decisions without regard to a person's immigration 
status. 64 
B. The District Court Opinion 
The district court granted the defendants' motion and dis-
missed the plaintiffs' action with prejudice. 65 The district 
court's holding bears repeating at length, because it captures 
the reasons why the court dismissed AFSC's suit. 
[A]ssuming I.R.C.A. has a substantial impact upon plaintiffs' 
free exercise rights as alleged, the plaintiffs' interests cannot 
overcome the government's interest in immigration control as a 
matter of law. The Court finds, moreover, that plaintiffs cannot 
state a claim because a reasonable accommodation for 
plaintiffs' religious practice in the form of an exemption to 
I.R.C.A. is not feasible .... Granting an exemption to the 
61. Abrams, supra note fi2, at 148. (referring to relief efforts by AFSC before 
its receipt of the 1947 Nobel Peace Prize). 
62. Wasson, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the humanitarian efforts of AFSC 
during the past decade); Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without 
Jury-A novernment's Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, lfi HOFSTHA L. 
REV. 5, 25 n.106 (1986) (quoting Goldman, U.S. Clerics Debating Ethics of Giving 
Sanctuary to Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1985, at A1, col. 3) (listing the churches 
and religious organizations who publicly supported the sanctuary movement). 
63. American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 140fi, 1406 
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
64. See id. 
65. By granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the district court in effect 
denied AFSC a full trial on the merits. Instead the court ruled on the basis of the 
briefs and the law, and found that the law gave AFSC no basis for its claim. Tho-
rnburgh, 718 F. Supp. at 823. By granting the defendants' motion with prejudice 
the court barred further litigation by AFSC of its free exercise challenge of I.R.C.A. 
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed. 1990). 
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plaintiffs would have the effect of reactivating the employment 
"magnet" that Congress has endeavored to turn-off by enacting 
I.R.C.A.66 In essence, this holding says that AFSC's free exer-
cise interests, no matter how substantial, could not overcome 
the federal government's interest in controlling the flow of 
immigration. This decision may seem harsh from AFSC's point 
of view, but at least the district court weighed 
AFSC's interest in avoiding I.R.C.A. against the federal 
government's interest in compelling AFSC to comply with 
I.R.C.A.67 Because the Supreme Court decided Smith after the 
district court handed down its judgment but before AFSC could 
appeal that judgment,68 AFSC did not receive the benefit of 
that balancing test on appeal. 
C. The Ninth Circuit Opinion 
AFSC appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the 
dismissal, holding that "Smith ... requires rejection of AFSC's 
free exercise claim."69 
The Ninth Circuit gave three grounds supporting its hold-
ing on the free exercise issue. First, I.R.C.A.'s employer sanc-
tion provisions are neutral, meaning that they "are not aimed 
at suppressing the free exercise of religion."70 Second, AFSC's 
free exercise challenge to I.R.C.A.'s provisions fails to fit within 
the hybrid claims doctrine because the free exercise claim is 
not accompanied by another "cognizable constitutional 
claim.''71 Third, I.R.C.A. contains no procedures for granting 
individualized exemptions that might give AFSC constitutional 
grounds for obtaining a free exercise exemption. 72 
The Ninth Circuit found that I.R.C.A. survived the general 
rule of Smith, requiring only that a statute not have as its 
66. ld. To see where this language about employment as a magnet for illegal 
aliens originated, refer to supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
67. See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820, 
823 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
68. Smith was decided April 17, 1990. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 872 (1990). The Ninth Circuit decided Thornburgh August 2, 1991. American 
Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 808 (9th Cir. 1991). 
69. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis added). 
70. ld. 
71. Id. 
72. ld. 
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object the suppression of religious practice. 73 Under the 
Sherbert balancing test the court might have gone on to ask 
whether I.R.C.A. had the effect of prohibiting the members of 
AFSC from practicing their religion. 74 The facts of 
Thornburgh intimate the quandary in which AFSC found itself. 
Its Quaker members could not satisfy the demands of their 
faith without violating I.R.C.A., and vice versa.75 
The Thornburgh court, however, cannot be accused of mis-
applying precedent. Its application of Smith is probably correct 
to a fault. The court read Smith to require only the barest 
inquiry into the question whether a statute reveals antireli-
gious bias on its face. 76 The language of the Smith opinion 
requires no further inquiry. Unless Congress was imprudent 
enough to say that I.R.C.A. marked an attempt to impose a 
burden on a particular religion, the statute should survive judi-
cial scrutiny. This is true regardless of whether I.R.C.A. actual-
ly burdens the Quakers' religious practice. The obstacle to 
AFSC's free exercise challenge lies with the Smith rule itself, 
not with the Ninth Circuit's application of it. 
The Thornburgh Court's third reason for deciding that 
I.R.C.A. did not violate AFSC's free exercise rights was that 
I.R.C.A. does not provide for the type of individualized exemp-
tions that the Smith Court identified as an exception to its 
general rule. 77 One commentator has defined "individualized 
exemptions" in terms of instances when legally-binding deci-
sions are made ad hoc. Such decisions include "zoning, 
landmarking, and condemnation decisions."78 But the 
Thornburgh Court may not have read I.R.C.A. as much in favor 
of AFSC on this point as it might have done. 
Consider, for example, I.R.C.A.'s definition of an "unau-
thorized alien." Under I.R.C.A. an unauthorized alien is a per-
son who fits into one of two categories: "(A) an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so 
employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General."79 The 
n. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
74. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
75. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(l)-1324a(a)(2) (1988). 
76. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
77. !d. at 884. 
78. Laycock, supra note 4, at 48. 
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (1988). 
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first category is self-explanatory. The second consists of two 
subcategories. The first subcategory consists of aliens autho-
rized to work "by this chapter,"80 which in turn refers to 
aliens whom I.R.C.A. legalizes and to agricultural workers who 
may obtain a green card after eighteen months' agricultural 
work in the United States. The second subcategory refers to 
immigration decisions made by the Attorney General. This 
second subcategory might have provided AFSC with an excep-
tion to the Smith rule. 
In Smith the Court wrote, "where the State has in place a 
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend 
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling 
reason."81 If I.R.C.A. authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to 
make "individual exemptions" based on the particular circum-
stances of a person's case, the Ninth Circuit might have found 
that I.R.C.A. establishes "a system of individual exemptions." If 
I.R.C.A. establishes such a system, the Ninth Circuit should 
have required the Attorney General, who was, after all, a de-
fendant in Thornburgh, to extend an exemption to AFSC or to 
demonstrate a compelling reason why he should not.82 
Having addressed the first and third grounds of the Ninth 
Circuit's decision, we turn to the second issue it addressed: 
hybrid claims. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HYBRID CLAIMS 
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN THORNBURGH 
A. How the Ninth Circuit Applied the Hybrid Claims 
Doctrine in Thornburgh 
AFSC argued that its claim was a hybrid of a free exercise 
claim and the "right to employ."83 The court refuted that argu-
ment by demolishing the "right to employ" component of 
AFSC's purported hybrid. 84 It reasoned that "the right to em-
ploy" lacked constitutional significance and so could not evade 
the central holding of Smith. 85 
80. ld. 
81. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
82. ld. 
83. American Friends Serv. Corum. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
84. ld. 
85. "There would be little left of the Smith decision if an additional interest of 
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The court's reasoning appears to suggest that AFSC might 
have succeeded if it had coupled a stronger claim with its free 
exercise claim. Counsel for AFSC might have argued for a 
hybrid composed of free exercise and free expression claims. 
The free expression claim might be asserted because AFSC 
employed illegal aliens to express the organization's political 
disagreement with Congress's attempt to stop the influx of 
illegal aliens.86 To formulate a free expression claim in this 
manner is highly debatable, but it might have been closer to 
the truth than the "right to employ" and it has enough plau-
sibility that it might have compelled the AFSC Court to discuss 
the hybrid claims doctrine more carefully than it did. Counsel 
for AFSC should have known that the "right to employ" would 
leave the court an easy out: a wave of the hand, an allusion to 
"the Lochner court"87 and AFSC's hybrid claim dies a quick 
death. Pointing out this misstep, however, does not resolve the 
question of the validity of the hybrid claims doctrine. Should 
substantial constitutional claims based on the Free Exercise 
Clause hang on such a slim thread as the choice of which con-
stitutional right should accompany a free exercise claim? Could 
AFSC have increased its likelihood of success by constructing a 
stronger hybrid claim? 
B. How the Ninth Circuit's Application of the Hybrid Claims 
Doctrine Affected AFSC in Thornburgh 
Even after a close reading of Thornburgh, it remains un-
clear how much the Ninth Circuit's holding on the hybrid 
claims issue will affect AFSC. If nothing more, the court's hold-
ing makes it more difficult for AFSC to accomplish its religious 
such slight constitutional weight as the 'right to hire' were sufficient to qualify for 
this [hybrid claims] exception." ld. 
86. Recall that AFSC publicly revealed its participation in the Sanctuary Move-
ment. Colbert, supra note 62, at 5, n.106. 
87. American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). This allusion ought to suggest the well-known 
fact that asserting anything resembling the "liberty of contract" at issue in Lochner 
spells almost certain defeat in federal court, given the general distaste with which 
Lochner is viewed. For a survey of the political, economic, and social forces that 
caused the demise of Lochner and its style of constitutional adjudication in cases 
asserting economic rights, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
578-81 (2d ed. 1991). 
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mission. 88 At most the court's holding compels AFSC to refuse 
to hire or continue employing illegal aliens. This dissonance 
between the religious aims of the organization and the secular 
means that the organization may legally use to accomplish 
those aims may lead to two consequences for AFSC. 
First, the organization now presents a public persona that 
runs contrary to a fundamental quality of the Quaker religion: 
readiness to relieve suffering. 89 AFSC appears hypocritical by 
refusing to employ the same people whom it otherwise reaches 
out to help. Some observers may doubt AFSC's commitment to 
its own religious mission because I.R.C.A. keeps AFSC from 
employing people without regard for their employment status. 
Second, the organization's officers and members must 
choose between living their religion and staying out of jail. (The 
threat of criminal penalties for large employers who engage in 
a "pattern or practice" of disobeying I.R.C.A. will surely hang 
heavy over any decision that AFSC makes with respect to 
I.R.C.A.)90 Given its prosecutorial discretion, the Justice De-
partment may choose to apply I.R.C.A. to AFSC by assessing 
civil sanctions without necessarily initiating criminal prosecu-
tions against AFSC. However defensible, this choice is not 
mandated by I.R.C.A. The law allows for criminal prosecution 
when an employer exhibits a "pattern or practice" of disobeying 
the law.91 If AFSC chooses to pursue its religious mission in 
spite of the law, it will likely find itself the subject of heavy 
civil penalties (no small sanction to lay on a charitable organi-
zation) and even criminal penalties. 
C. Thornburgh Suggests that the Hybrid Claims Doctrine 
Provides No Genuine Exception to the Central Holding of 
Smith 
Given the ease with which the Ninth Circuit dispensed 
with AFSC's hybrid claim, one may infer that the court didn't 
RR See Laycock, supra note 4, at 5fi-fi6. 
89. American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 140fi, 1406 
(9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). . 
90. Compare American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 
1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion) with Laycock, supra note 4, at 29-30, 
fi7. 
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (1988). 
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read the hybrid claims doctrine as a serious exception to Smith 
(a genuine path for plaintiffs to circumvent its holding) at 
all.92 Moreover, as another commentator has noted, "[a] con-
stitutional right that has meaning only when it is combined 
with another right would be anomalous."93 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly rejected the plaintiffs' implicit reading of the 
hybrid claims doctrine. 94 
Instead the court read the hybrid claims doctrine as an 
attempt to distinguish precedent. The court read the Smith 
opinion's language about hybrid claims and concluded that any 
category of hybrid claim other than those explicitly mentioned 
by the Smith Court would undermine that case's holding.95 A 
skeptic might say that AFSC failed because its hybrid claim 
was so weak. Because the Ninth Circuit read the hybrid claims 
doctrine as an attempt to distinguish precedent and not as a 
genuine means of evading the core holding of Smith, no hybrid 
claim could have survived its scrutiny. In its totality, 
Thornburgh suggests that the hybrid claims doctrine provides 
only an illusory refuge from the central holding of Smith. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs wishing to assert a claim under the free exercise 
clause should not expect much protection by invoking the hy-
brid claims doctrine. Read carefully, the Ninth Circuit's ruling 
in Thornburgh means that the hybrid claims doctrine is a 
failed attempt to distinguish flatly contradictory precedent.96 
Understood in this way, the hybrid claims doctrine provides 
only an illusory means of circumventing the core holding of 
Smith. With the demise of the hybrid claims doctrine as a gen-
uine exception to Smith, religious practice has no constitutional 
shelter from the shifting tides of majoritarian will. 
Shawn Gunnarson 
92. See also McConnell, supra note 5, at 1122: "[A] legal realist would tell 
us . . . that the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid claims was not intended to be 
taken seriously." 
9a. Gordon, supra note 39, at 98. 
94. See American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 
1408 (9th Cir. 1992) (amended opinion). 
9fi. TJwrnburph, 961 F.2d at 1408. 
96. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
